How Russian Propaganda Fails to Stop Armenia's Drift Westward

Written by Stepan Onyshchuk | Winter 2025 |

Introduction

Since the Russian Empire defeated Iranian and Ottoman forces in the 1820s, the Kremlin has envisioned the Caucasus as part of its sphere of influence. However, following Russia’s struggle in the war against Ukraine, Russian influence has declined sharply in the South Caucasus. Despite previously being a hegemon in the region, the Kremlin was not even invited to the 2025 White House peace talks ending the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The battle, which Moscow had ignited with funding and mercenaries, lasted nearly 37-year, but in August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace agreement to end a conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.^[1] Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev signed the final deal in the White House, and the former foes praised U.S. leadership in ending the war.^[2] Both leaders nominated the President of the United States, Donald Trump, for a Nobel Peace Prize.^[3] Per the treaty, the solution to the Karabakh conflict was to construct a transport corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its enclave region through Armenian territory.^[4] U.S. companies would build and operate the route, and both sides even agreed to call the proposed construction the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity – a sign of American influence superseding the Kremlin.

Just five years before the end of the conflict, the Kremlin was the dominant power in the South Caucasus – breaking the ceasefire in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020.. Over 44 days, Azerbaijani forces broke through defensive lines that Armenians had spent three decades fortifying – winning the war and regaining control over three-quarters of the region. For Erdogan, Azerbaijan’s victory embodied his growing influence in the area. Vladimir Putin used the 44-Day War to reinforce his monopolistic influence in the South Caucasus. The ceasefire agreement granted the Russian army exclusive control over the only remaining road connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.^[5]

However, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine soon weakened this dominance. Russian aggression led to the nation’s global isolation and exclusion from Western markets. Russia soon became the most sanctioned country in the world,^[6] and the International Court of Justice issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin.^[7] Post-Soviet states used Russia’s declining influence to limit the former suzerain’s regional role. For example, Azerbaijan sent over 40 million dollars for Ukraine’s humanitarian needs, and Azerbaijani President Aliev advised the Ukrainian people “not to accept the occupation”^[8]

This research examines the Russian influence on Armenia from the democratisation of the Soviet Union in February 1986 until the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in August 2025. This paper argues that this influence ultimately undermined Armenia’s democratic development by supporting Armenian authoritarian and ultranationalist forces. To turn Armenia into a satellite state entirely dependent on Russia, the Kremlin attempted to prevent a democratic Armenia and a sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By isolating Armenia and promoting authoritarianism, the Russian government hoped to remain the sole influence on Yerevan. However, as Russian influence decreased in the region, the Armenian government successfully limited the Russian media and military presence. By embracing peace-building and liberalisation, Armenia is rapidly developing into an independent state and a thriving democracy.

Historical Overview

In February 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced the new policy of glasnost as a means to usher in a new era of transparency and openness in the Soviet Union.^[9] Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan used democratisation to demand their right to national self-determination.^[10] Historically, Nagorno-Karabakh was both a part of Armenia and the Ottoman Empire. It is a sacred, religious, and cultural place for both Armenian Christians and Ottoman Muslims.^[11] By 1989, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was three-quarters Armenian and a quarter Azerbaijanis.^[12] The conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Karabakh resulted in mutual population expulsion, violence, and pogroms.^[13]

On September 21st, 1991, Armenia declared independence from the collapsing Soviet Union. Soon, Armenians in Karabakh declared the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, an independent republic with limited recognition. In just months, independent Armenia and Azerbaijan started armed combat over the region. In the face of limited global recognition of Armenian separatist claims, the Russian Federation was the only significant power to supply Armenia with weapons. Russia’s support was a substantial factor in Armenia’s military victory. For 30 years after the First Karabakh War, Russia used the Karabakh problem to sustain its influence in Armenia.^[14] In 2020, Russia established its control over the Karabakh-Armenian border as a mediator in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War,^[15]but in 2023, Azerbaijan regained its complete control over Karabakh.

The Republic of Artsakh was never recognised by any UN member, including Armenia. Even after the Revolution, the unresolved Karabakh crisis limited Armenian cooperation with the West. Russia was interested in continuing the frozen conflict in Karabakh. The Kremlin hoped it would tie Armenia to Moscow and discredit the Armenian government in the West because it supports the separatists. The Russian Federation’s influence prevented Armenian democratic transformation by supporting Armenian authoritarian nationalist parties, sustaining the breakaway state in Karabakh to prevent peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

After Artsakh’s capitulation in 2023, Russia lost in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Today, Russia’s influence on Armenia is exerted mainly within the country’s democratic institutions, as the Kremlin uses its popular Russian state TV to discredit the pro-Western post-revolutionary government and to prevent Armenia’s democratisation. Russia uses its propaganda to attempt to return Armenia’s former autocrats, Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, to power in a government currently controlled by the Western-leaning Prime Minister Pashinyan.

Russian Propaganda Versus Armenia’s Democratisation

The Russian Federation’s influence in Armenia attempts to reverse democratisation by supporting parties with authoritarian leanings. The Velvet Revolution of 2017 undermined the Russian influence in Armenia, when a liberal MP, alongside the investigative journalist Nikola Pashinyan, led a popular protest against President Sargsyan., Sargsyan, after two terms in office, attempted to restructure Armenia into a parliamentary republic with himself as Prime Minister.^[16] After the protest movement's success, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not use rhetoric borrowed from Mikhail Saakashvili, a revolutionary leader in neighbouring Georgia famous for his pro-NATO and pro-EU reforms, along with a staunch anti-Russian stance; instead, he chose a path of compromise.

Following the Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan, despite coming to power with promises of liberalisation of the Armenian-Turkish relationship, democratisation, and anti-corruption, attempted to maintain friendly relations with the Kremlin. He even irritated the Western leaders by providing technical support to the Russian intervention in Syria.^[17] The Kremlin, however, remained sceptical of the former revolutionary, and Russian state propaganda continuously attacked Pashinyan and instead supported Sargsyan, a former autocratic leader who led Armenian nationalists in their attempt to return to power.

In contemporary Armenian politics, these Russia-backed parties utilise ultra-patriotic and nationalist rhetoric to gain public support. They brand Armenia’s pro-democratic leadership as ‘cowards’ and ‘traitors’.^[18] Kremlin-controlled TV channels are a vital instrument of this propaganda, as the Russian state TV and Armenian-oriented Russian state-owned broadcaster Sputnik have remained one of the most popular information sources in Armenia. After Azerbaijan’s 2023 military operation in Karabakh, for example, Russia’s prime-time talk show blamed the Western-leaning Pashinyan for Armenia’s defeat, calling the former revolutionary a ‘harbinger of trouble’.^[19] Leaks from the Kremlin published confirm that in September of 2023, after the Azerbaijani offensive in Karabakh, the Kremlin gave an order to the state media to blame Pashinyan for the defeat in Karabakh.^[20] Russian leadership even attempted to inspire the nationalist-led protests against Pashinyan in the face of the capitulation to Azerbaijan in Karabakh.^[21] The two prominent faces of this pro-Kremlin nationalist movement are two of Armenia's former presidents: Robert Kocharyan, who was in power from 1998 to 2008, and Serzh Sargsyan, who served from 2008 to 2018. The Pashinyan-led revolution ruined their tandemocracy, and scholars and journalists commonly call their tandem the ‘Karabakh clan’ because of the mafioso-like governance, corruption, and accent on Armenian irredentism. The two former presidents started their political careers in Karabakh, and both are connected with Armenian separatist movements in that region.^[22] 

Russian propaganda in their coverage of Armenia seeks to connect Pashinyan’s pro-Western aspirations with his failures in Karabakh. Russia’s orders to propagandists, as leaked by Meduza, confirm that the Kremlin attempted to blame the Karabakh capitulation on Armenia’s partnership with the West. Instead, they argue that only pro-Russian nationalists can restore strength, order, and security. Nationalists, subsequently, share the Kremlin’s rhetoric. Former president Sargsyan has repeatedly criticised Pashinyan for ‘disrespecting Putin’.^[23] His ally, Kocharyan, has also always emphasised his friendship with Putin, calling it a ‘special chemistry’.^[24] During the parliamentary elections in 2020, Putin also called former president Kocharyan his ‘friend’.^[25] The purpose of Russia’s propaganda campaign against the pro-Western Armenian government is to ensure that Armenian public opinion will be pro-Russian. The pro-Russian-leaning public opinion would create a Sword of Damocles over Pashinyan’s government if it attempts to continue the pro-Western shift. It could even contribute to dissolving the pro-Western government during an election or a popular protest, replacing it with a friendly Sargsyan-Kocharyan tandem. Suppose the Kremlin, however, loses its support in Armenia. In that case, it might allow Pashinyan to make even more radical pro-Western moves, such as deepening the ties with the EU or expelling the Russian military base in Armenia’s second-largest city, Gyumri.

Remarkably, the Kremlin utilises Armenia’s democratic institutions to bring to power politicians who aim to undermine those same free institutions. The weaponisation of democratic institutions, however, has not brought the expected results. Despite waves of massive protests, a coup d'état attempt, and an unplanned election, Pashinyan remains a popular leader.

Pashinyan’s Response to the Russian Propaganda

Pashinyan’s response to the Russian propaganda has been a successful set of gradual actions that have allowed him to decrease the Kremlin’s informational influence, deter Russia’s neo-imperialism, and maintain a pro-Western geopolitical shift. As Thucydides emphasised in his History of the Peloponnesian War, if one’s opponent tremendously outnumbers them, they should cautiously act against their opponent in a manner that would not provoke any radical action. Additionally, according to Thucydides, one could wait for turning points in the uneven rivalry, such as when one’s opponent will temporarily or permanently be distracted or weakened.

For Pashinyan, this turning point was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite Russia’s plan to suppress Ukraine’s military resistance in a few days, the invasion turned into a calamity for the Kremlin. They failed to take Kyiv, eliminate Ukrainian political leadership, or destroy military resistance.^[26] Two years later, the Russo-Ukrainian War is effectively in a stalemate: neither Ukraine nor Russia can achieve military goals despite losing thousands of soldiers monthly.

Armenia, however, became a surprising beneficiary of the conflict. Devastated by the war and sanctions, the Kremlin is no longer able to maintain such tight control over Armenian leadership or allocate enough resources for the containment of Pashinyan and his pro-Western initiatives. More than 300,000 Russians, mostly liberal-minded, relocated to Armenia to escape Putin’s autocratic regime after the war’s breakout. Together with the Armenian Central Bank’s successful monetary policy, this led to a ‘remarkable’ economic growth of 12.6% in 2022.^[27] Impressive economic development and the Kremlin’s weakness allowed Pashinyan to shift westwards and limit Russian propaganda.

The Kremlin’s leaked documents in Meduza confirm that one of their propaganda focuses is promoting the idea that Russia can provide peace and security to Armenia and Armenians in Karabakh. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia’s 15th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade took control over the Karabakh-Armenian border as peacekeepers guarding the Lachin corridor, the only road to connect Armenia to the remnants of separatist-controlled territory in Karabakh. With Russia’s failure in Ukraine, the Kremlin did not have enough power to be an effective peacekeeping force.

 In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a surprising offensive to regain separatist-controlled Khankendi, Karabakh’s administrative capital. Azerbaijan gained a sweeping victory, restoring its territorial integrity.^[28] Simultaneously, Pashinyan showed that peace in the Caucasus is possible without Russia. Russia was too weak to prevent the Azerbaijani offensive despite the security guarantees given in 2020. Soon, the EU and the US became the primary mediators in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, and Russia’s role as a peacekeeping force and a mediator was effectively eliminated.^[29]

Additionally, after 2022, Pashinyan, who was previously cautious about Western involvement, began to consider it politically appropriate to share his vision of the West as a partner and an ally for Armenia. In March 2024, foreign minister Mirzoyan went as far as saying that Armenia ‘considers’ membership in the EU, a previously unprecedented statement from an Armenian official.^[30] Simultaneously, he announced the expulsion of the Russian soldiers from Zvartnots, Yerevan’s main airport.^[31] These statements came after Pashynian’s speech in the European Parliament, where he was met with a standing ovation from the European deputies.^[32] In a similar show of Western support, with the backdrop of an Armenian conflict with Azerbaijan, Speaker Pelosi became the most high-ranking American official to ever visit Armenia in September 2022^[33]. These visits and the increased cooperation showed the Kremlin that Armenia both politically and economically prospers while it decreases the Kremlin's influence on its former territory. For many Armenians, the Kremlin's attempt to juxtapose Armenia’s democracy with its security became irrelevant in contemporary Armenia’s political dialogue. Russia’s narrative is increasingly dispelled as Armenians see their country achieve institutional and financial progress without the Kremlin’s assistance.

In recent years, Pashinyan has directly challenged Russian propaganda more frequently. In the early years after the Revolution, Pashinyan was remarkably cautious about criticising Russian propaganda, as he did not want to cool down already cold relations with the Kremlin. However, as he drifted Westwards from Russia’s influence, his government started limiting propaganda’s impact on Armenian life. For example, the Armenian government labelled the statements of Russian propagandists in TV shows about Armenian officials after Khankendi’s fall ‘inappropriate’. In an unprecedented move, the Armenian MFA issued a note verbale to the Russian Ambassador Kopyrkin about the matter.^[34] Soon, the Armenian government went even further. In March 2024, they suspended broadcasting of the Russian state-controlled station, Sputnik, for ‘humiliating’ Pashinyan.^[35] Similarly, the government declared Margarita Simonyan, an ethnic Armenian who leads the Kremlin’s propaganda Russia Today, a persona non grata.^[36] Moreover, in late March 2024, the Armenian government banned Russia’s most popular talk show hosted by infamous propagandist Vladimir Soloviev.^[37]

Pashinyan’s recent actions show that he used Russia’s apathy during Artsakh’s fall in 2023 as a casus belli against Russian propaganda. Gradually, the Armenian government took measures to limit the Kremlin's impact on Armenian public opinion, and Pashinyan succeeded in ostracising Russia’s role in Armenian domestic policy. Without the Kremlin's influence on Yerevan’s domestic decisions, Pashinyan has greater mobility for geopolitical independence. He utilises this independence to rapidly increase cooperation with the EU and the US, and utilise Russian anti-war expats in Armenia to further the country's economic prosperity.

Russia loses the Caucasus: implications and Armenia’s potential strategies.

The Kremlin’s collapsing influence in Armenia has and will continue to have tremendous regional implications. Yerevan remained the Kremlin's last ally in the Caucasus for a long time after Tbilisi’s two decades of pro-Western policies and Baku’s close alliance with Turkey. Future implications of Russia’s decreasing influence in Armenia may include a scenario in which the Kremlin plays va banque once it feels it has nothing to lose in Armenia. The Kremlin might lose hope for the political triumph of its sympathisers: recent public opinion polls indicate that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract (21%) is more than 5 times more popular than its closest opponent, Sargsyan's Armenia Alliance (4%).^[38] Allegedly, Russia planned a failed 2016 coup in Montenegro.^[39] Pashinyan has already survived a coup d'état in 2021, and many fear the Kremlin might attempt another similar plot.

While the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace labels Russia’s influence on Armenia as ‘dwelling fast’, it highlights that many Armenian veterans hate’ Pashinyan and the Kremlin might utilise them for its purposes.^[40] To prevent the rise of Russian influence in Armenia, Pashinyan’s steps may include the decommunisation of symbols of the totalitarian regime and the lustration of state servicemen who were high-ranking officials under the Sargsyan-Kocharyan authoritarian government. Both lustration and decommunisation were introduced by several post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine, as a fast way to eliminate totalitarian narratives and architectural statues to the Communists. The lustration would eliminate servicemen who were engaged with the authoritarian regime before the revolution in 2018 and now might be compromised by former authorities or the Russian authorities. Armenia should also urgently close the Russian military base in Gyumri. If Pashinyan learned any lesson from Ukraine, he should understand how the Russians use their military bases as a springboard to occupy the disobedient countries.

Most of all, as implied by the foreign minister, Armenia’s membership in the European Union could serve as democracy’s highest triumph. Not only would it turn Armenia into a regional leader and a guideline for aspiring democracies, but it would also show how the Armenian people successfully overcame radical nationalism, authoritarianism, and Russian influence because of their faith in the EU’s values and principles. The European Union could help rebuild Armenia’s catastrophic infrastructure and attract investors to support Armenia’s businesses, health system, and education. Above all, it could be the most significant internal and external stability factor.

Conclusion

After the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828, Russia victoriously became a geopolitical leader in the Caucasus. The Armenians welcomed it, seeing Orthodox brothers as a replacement for the Ottoman Muslims. Soon, however, the Russian Empire introduced its colonial regulations over Armenia. For two centuries, as both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Russia executed and exiled many prominent Armenian leaders. Additionally, throughout the same period, the Armenian language has undergone a process of Russification. After Armenia’s independence from the Soviet Union, the Kremlin attempted to control its former colony by ensuring its democratic backsliding. The Kremlin’s toxic influence was exerted in the 1990s through supporting the Armenian Armed Forces fighting for Karabakh, a territory unanimously internationally recognised as a part of Azerbaijan.

After the Velvet Revolution, the Kremlin's influence was largely represented by its TV propaganda. However, the Azerbaijani offensive of 2023 in Karabakh and the White House peace agreement of 2025 were a historical turning point in Armenia's democratisation.

Disappointed by Russia’s inability to protect Armenians in Karabakh, Pashinyan used Russia’s failures in Ukraine to shift Armenia’s foreign policy towards the EU and NATO. With the increased limitations on the Russian propaganda, stable economic growth, and ever-closer ties with the West, Armenia has successfully tackled Russian neo-imperial influence. Six years after the Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan’s government became ever louder and more unequivocal in its desire to break its connection to its former coloniser and join the European community of free nations. If Armenia sustains its westward turn, it will not only safeguard its democracy but also emerge as a model for post-Soviet states still shadowed by Moscow’s legacy.

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^[1] “Publication of the Initialed Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, August 2025. https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2025/08/11/Initialed%20Arm-Az%20Peace%20Agreement%20text/13394.

^[2] “Leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan Shake Hands and Sign Deal at White House Peace Summit.” AP News, August 9, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-white-house-armenia-azerbaijan-069379e9c4a058c96af38afbf4684829. 

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] “Publication of the Initialed Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” 

^[5] “Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan | Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed August 18, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict.

^[6] Sanctions against countries supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - House of Commons Library. Accessed August 18, 2025. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10048/.

^[7] “Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova | International Criminal Court.” The International Criminal Court of Justice. Accessed August 18, 2025. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.

^[8] “Azerbaijan Sends New Batch of Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine.” Caspianpost.com, August 15, 2025. https://caspianpost.com/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-sends-new-batch-of-humanitarian-aid-to-ukraine; Volkova, Ekaterina. “Aliev Takes the Ukrainian Side for the First Time (Translated from Russian).” Gazeta.Ru, August 2025.

^[9] “Perestroika: Glasnost, Definition & Soviet Union.” History.com, May 28, 2025. https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/perestroika-and-glasnost.

^[10] Niall M. Fraser and Keith W. Hipel, John Jaworsky, and Ralph Zuljan. “A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4 (1990): 652–677. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002790034004004

^[11] Hratch Tchilingirian. “Religious Discourse on the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh.” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 18, no. 4 (1998): Article 1. https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol18/iss4/1

^[12] Joshua Kucera. “With New Offensive, Azerbaijan Tightens Grip on Nagorno-Karabakh.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, September 20, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-armenia-karabakh-analysis/32601613.html

^[13] Patricia Carley. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution.” United States Institute of Peace, November 4, 2020. https://www.usip.org/publications/1998/12/nagorno-karabakh-searching-solution-0.

^[14] Andrei Aleksandrov. “Russian and Armenian Political Scientists—about the Role of Russia in Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘The Task Is to Support the Smoldering Conflict in Order to Have Influence’ (published in Russian).” Nastoyashchee Vremya, September 21, 2023. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/russia-s-role-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/32602733.html.

^[15] Zoylan. “How the West Managed to Sideline Russia in Mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88347.

^[16] Wojciech Góretski. “The Success of the Revolution in Armenia. Pashinyan Elected Prime Minister.” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, September 5, 2018. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-05-09/success-revolution-armenia-pashinyan-elected-prime-minister.

^[17] Mikayel Zolyan. “Defeated Armenia Looks to a New, Post-Russia Foreign Policy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 27, 2023. https://carnegieendowm Perestroika ent.org/politika/91121.

^[18] Brailian. “Ani Mejlumyan: ‘Russia Could Achieve a Regime Change in Armenia, Mascaraing pro-Russian Leaders as Nationalists and Patriots.’” Detector Media, November 20, 2023. https://en.detector.media/post/ani-mejlumyan-russia-could-achieve-a-regime-change-in-armenia-mascaraing-pro-russian-leaders-as-nationalists-and-patriots.

^[19] Ani Avetisyan. “Kremlin Propaganda Turns up the Heat on Armenia.” OC Media, December 21, 2023. https://oc-media.org/features/kremlin-propaganda-turns-up-the-heat-on-armenia/.

^[20] Andrey Perstev. “Meduza Found out How the Kremlin Recommends State Media Cover Events in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Meduza, November 20, 2023. https://meduza.io/feature/2023/09/20/meduza-vyyasnila-kak-kreml-rekomenduet-gosudarstvennym-smi-osveschat-sobytiya-v-nagornom-karabahe.

^[21] Ekaterina Tonkopei. “The Armenian Foreign Ministry Protested to the Russian Ambassador over the TV Program.” Izvestiya, October 25, 2023. https://iz.ru/1594686/2023-10-25/mid-armenii-vyrazil-protest-poslu-rossii-iz-za-teleperedachi.

^[22] Wojciech Górecki. “A Revolution in Instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia Now?” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, October 19, 2018. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-09-10/a-revolution-instalments-whither-pashinyans-armenia-now.

^[23] “The Ex-President of Armenia Accused Pashinyan of Disrespect for Putin.” Ria Novosti, June 9, 2021. https://ria.ru/20210609/uvazhenie-1736226089.html.

^[24] “Vladimir Putin Is Accepted as a Friend, Relative and Ally: Kocharyan about His Friendship with Putin.” iravabannet, October 20, 2020. https://iravaban.net/en/285141.html.

^[25] Naira Martikian. “Putin wishes friend, ex-President of armenia kocharyan happy birthday - Jamnews.” English Jamnews, January 17, 2022. https://jam-news.net/putin-wishes-happy-birthday-ex-president-armenia-robert-kocharyan/.

^[26] “Investigative Report Says Putin Made Decision to Invade Ukraine in March 2021.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, April 25, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-lanned-ukraine-invasion-march-2021-vyorstka/32379171.html.

^[27] Chervyakov, Dmitry. “Relocation of Russian Citizens Leads to Remarkable Economic Growth.” German Economic Team, 2023. https://www.german-economic-team.com/en/newsletter/relocation-of-russian-citizens-leads-to-remarkable-economic-growth/.

^[28] Christian Edwards. “Nagorno-Karabakh Will Cease to Exist from next Year. How Did This Happen?” CNN, September 28, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/28/europe/nagorno-karabakh-officially-dissolve-intl/index.html.

^[29] Anna Caprile. “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Between War and Peace: Think Tank: European Parliament.” Think Tank | European Parliament, June 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)747919.

^[30] Gian Volpicelli. “Armenia Mulling EU Membership Application, Foreign Minister Says.” POLITICO, March 9, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-mulling-eu-membership-application-foreign-minister-mirzoyan-says/.

^[31] Denis Leven. “Armenia Moves to Expel Russian Border Guards from Yerevan’s Airport.” POLITICO, March 7, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-foreign-minister-ararat-mirzoyan-russia-border-guards-yerevan-zvartnots-airport/.

^[32] ​​“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Speech at the European Parliament.” The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, October 17, 2023. https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/17/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/.

^[33] Carlotta Gall. “Nancy Pelosi Visits Armenia amid Conflict with Azerbaijan.” The New York Times, September 17, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/17/world/europe/nancy-pelosi-armenia.html.

^[34] Tonkopei, “Armenian Foreign Ministry Protested to the Russian Ambassador.”

^[35] “Armenia Suspends License of Russian Broadcaster Sputnik.” The Moscow Times, April 2, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/12/21/armenia-suspends-license-of-russian-broadcaster-sputnik-a83513.

^[36] Hawkish Russian broadcaster Simonyan says she has been banned from ..., August 26, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hawkish-russian-broadcaster-simonyan-says-she-has-been-banned-armenia-2022-10-26/.

^[37] “Propagandist Soloviev’s Talk Show Was Banned in Armenia.” Novaya Gazeta, March 29, 2024. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2024/03/29/tok-shou-propagandista-soloveva-zapretili-v-armenii-news.

^[38] “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia: January-March 2023.” International Republican Institute, May 9, 2023. https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-residents-of-armenia-january-march-2023/.

^[39] Julia Dickson, and Emily Harding. “Russia Aims at Montenegro.” CSIS, February 13, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-aims-montenegro.

^[40] Kirill Krivosheyev. “Russia’s Remaining Leverage over Armenia Is Dwindling Fast.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , March 13, 2024.